Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 4

Article

2006

Taxing Obesity - Or Perhaps the Opposite
Saul Levmore
Uinversity of Chicago Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Law and Society Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Saul Levmore, Taxing Obesity - Or Perhaps the Opposite, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 575 (2005-2006)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

TAXING OBESITY – OR PERHAPS THE OPPOSITE
SAUL LEVMORE1
The true subject of this Lecture is the question of why we regulate some things
and not others, and then how we might predict future regulation. Let me begin with
my conclusion, to be developed at greater length in other work. Its academic novelty
will be the notion that a fair amount of regulation is best understood as fostering selfcontrol on behalf of the governed. I will suggest that we add this explanation, or
category, of government intervention to the more familiar ones of public goods,
coordination, interest group capture, and negative externalities where there are high
transaction costs. Its practical or political angle is predicting the future of
intervention with respect to our latest perceived crisis, that of American obesity.2 If
we gathered in 1964, my application might have been to the future of tobacco
regulation. One question is whether today’s obesity is like yesteryear’s smoking.
What distinguishes smoking, college education, fisheries, child safety seats, and
unsafe driving from fatty foods, sedentary lifestyles, day trading of stock, driving in
foul weather, and sunburns? The answer is that the government takes an intense
interest in regulating everything on the first list and then almost no interest in the
second, though it contains no less serious social problems.
We have various ways of explaining “why and when” of government
interventions, a small subset of which I just offered as my first list. In some cases,
government intervention serves a coordination role, as it might with rules like
driving on the left or right; in others it discourages selfishness and controls negative
externalities, as they are called, as in pollution controls or prosecutions of thefts; and
in some it simply encourages the production of public goods. But in some
circumstances law works to encourage individuals to do what they themselves are
likely to think in their own interest, though perhaps at a different time or place. It is
this self-control strategy that I will emphasize, for it is one that seems particularly apt
with respect to obesity. It suggests that we think of obesity as more like retirement
savings and only somewhat like smoking and driving regulation. Our government
spends a great deal of effort and money to encourage retirement planning. Most of us
(and even those who are young) wish we saved more for the future, and we enlist our
government to help us do so – at the expense of taxpayers who do not. Lucky for us,
retirement planning serves some interest groups well; Wall Street encourages savings
plans, while those who lose from this intervention are dispersed and disorganized.
But now that I have started at the end and told you exactly where we are heading, let

1
Dean & William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. This
lecture was delivered at the Cleveland-Marshall Law School in September, 2005. I am most
grateful for that opportunity and for the hospitality and intellectual energy I enjoyed in
discussing this and other topics with the school’s faculty and students.
2
Over the last forty years the percentage of obese adults in America has risen from 13.3%
to 31.1%. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2004, at 242
(2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus04.pdf. Obesity is, however,
somewhat arbitrarily defined. A neutral description might be that youths and adults in the U.S.
are getting heavier, and that however obesity might be defined, it has increased.
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us fill in some gaps by beginning with the more familiar, and apt, comparison
between obesity and smoking.
Our governments have regulated tobacco for some time, but they have done more
to stop smoking since second-hand smoke, a classic negative externality, attracted
attention.3 Obesity is weak in this regard. My over-eating or inadequate exercise
might disturb your aesthetic field or add greatly to your health insurance or Medicare
costs one day, but such emotional and monetary effects are caused by countless
personal decisions that we might try to nudge one way or another but that we mostly
leave to individuals. With much fanfare and controversy, we lightly regulate helmets
for motorcyclists, job training for the underemployed, and safety equipment in
automobiles, while we barely encourage small automobiles and sun protection,
though all these precautions could be undertaken by individuals to save themselves
money, to be sure, but could also be encouraged in the interest of saving expenses
imposed on others.
The negative externalities associated with smoking regulation are really quite
modest compared to its self-control potential. You have probably read that the
external costs are modest; it is the sort of counterintuitive fact that law professors
love. The extra costs the smoker adds to shared health care expenses have been said
to be more than offset by the decrease in retirement benefits paid out to the smoker.
And so, the academic mind continues, perhaps the government should be
encouraging smokers! I hate to throw cold water on this fancy, but more recent
studies show that the external costs probably do exceed the external benefits, though
they do so by only a modest amount.4 We could try to explain the significant taxes
on cigarettes as aiming to monetize those external costs. It should be noted that these
taxes do, in fact, affect smoking. Addicts are not irrational, as it turns out, and the
impact of the tax is substantial once we take into account all the putative smokers
who are discouraged by higher prices from taking up the habit.5 Moreover, the costs
of smoking would seem yet greater if we took into account the expected loss of the
smoker as a productive member of society. We might provocatively say that the
government is a one-half owner of each of us (if only because of its investment in
our education or the share it takes out of our income), so that the citizenry has a
substantial incentive to encourage each individual to work hard and to adopt a
3

Federal excise tax increased from 8 to 16 cents per pack in 1983, and from 16 to 20 cents
in 1991. A number of state cigarette taxes were passed and/or significantly increased during
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The dangers of smoking to smokers had influenced different
education and labeling regulations from the mid 1960s on. However, the sharp increase in
cigarette taxation came about after the Surgeon General’s 1986 report on second hand smoke.
See Jonathan Gruber, Tobacco at a Crossroads: The Past and Future of Smoking Regulation
in the United States, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 2001, at 193; Robert A. Kagan and
William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation in the United States,
http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/research_programs/hist_papers/tobacco.pdf, (2000).
4

J. Chaloupka & Kenneth E. Warner, The Economics of Smoking, in 1 HANDBOOK
HEALTH ECONOMICS 1539 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse, eds. 2000).
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5
Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON.
675 (1988); Eugene M. Lewit, et. al., The Effects of Government Regulation on Teenage
Smoking, 24 J. L. & ECON. 545, 568 (1981). Pricing effects have also been shown to have
some effect on food choices. Simone A. French, Pricing Effects on Food Choices, J. NUTR.,
March 2003, Vol. 133, at 841S-843S.
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healthy lifestyle. But I will not make too much of this view of the external costs if
only because it raises philosophical problems about the role of government that
would take us too far afield.
In contrast, the internal, or self-imposed, costs of smoking are overwhelmingly
large. For starters, studies suggest that most smokers would prefer not to have
become smokers.6 People who choose to engage in first-hand smoke at the rate of a
pack a day are choosing to impose expected costs on themselves equal to six years of
life. The matter is complicated because the last six years of life might not be
regarded as worth as much as earlier ones, and the data do not include the quality of
life (up for pleasure or down for health problems). On the other hand, it is not as if
every smoker (or obese citizen or fast driver) will live to be 82 while clean-living
neighbors will live to be 88. Some will lose no time and some will die tomorrow, but
on average there is a 6 year loss. If we value those six years at just $75,000 per year
(extrapolating from risk studies and tort suits, which value lives these days at
somewhere between $3 and $7 million), and continue with the pack a day smoker
(our national average is actually a bit lower, but more than half of smokers do
consume a pack a day or more), then the internally imposed costs from smoking are
at least $35 per pack!7 A pack costs about $5 at my corner store these days, but there
is a respectable argument for taxing cigarettes so that they sell for $40 a pack! I
think we can all estimate that this would cut consumption. And a good argument
could be made that in order to protect us from ourselves we should want the
government to charge us, or our children who have not yet started smoking, an extra
$35 per pack in order to discourage smoking to the optimal degree. Why do we not
do this? A libertarian streak, perhaps, and fear of political backlash from smokers
who can no longer cease, many of whom will point to the regressive quality of the
tax both come to mind. The organized influence of tobacco companies (or other
groups) is a third possibility.
With this in mind, let us turn to obesity and consider, following very rough
estimates, that the internal costs of severe obesity approach those attached to habitual
smoking.8 A body mass index, or BMI, of 40 is associated with 6 years’ loss of life,
and that is also the mortality effect associated with regular smoking. A BMI of 35 is
associated with half that expected loss of years, but also with a high rate of diabetes
and other unpleasant issues.9 I am avoiding the question of whether obesity is the
causal agent, rather than inactivity or the kinds of food eaten, but skeptical as we
6

Studies suggest that some 70% of current smokers desire to quit. Current smokers are
obviously not quitting at the same rate. J.L. Schwartz, Methods of Smoking Cessation, 76:2
MED. CLIN. N. AM. 451 (1992).
7
Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Tax Incidence when Individuals are Timeinconsistent: The Case of Cigarette Excise Taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1959, 1973-74 (2004); Jeff
Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies 2223 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 286, 2004), available at
http://olin.stanford.edu/workingpapers/.
8

Strnad, supra note 7, at 22-23.

9

Kevin R. Fontaine, et. al., Years of Life Lost Due to Obesity, 289 J. AM. MED. ASSOC.
187, 190 (2003); Rita P. Raman, Obesity and Health Risks, 21 J. AM. COLL. OF NUTR. 134S
(2002) (detailing health risks related to obesity including heart disease, diabetes, and cetain
forms of cancer).
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may be there is surely some level of obesity that poses a serious health risk. For
listeners or readers unfamiliar with the struggles of dieting, a six-foot person who
weighs in at 184 has a BMI of 25. Should this person gain a few pounds, the
government’s guidelines declare him or her to be overweight. At 221, and therefore a
BMI of 30, he or she is regarded as obese. At 258, and a BMI of 35, the obesity is
serious, and at 294 pounds, or a BMI of 40, the individual is regarded as severely, or
morbidly, obese. Prior to 1988, a BMI of 27.8 was regarded as acceptable for males,
so that declarations of national crisis are easily criticized, for much of the
categorization is arbitrary. Still, a BMI of 35 is associated with substantial and
negative health effects; a BMI of 40 is associated with an expected loss of 6 years of
life. About one-third of American adults have BMIs>30; perhaps 4% have BMIs>40
(the level comparable to smoking one pack a day), and that is 30% higher than was
found a decade earlier. It is this increase that worries public health officials and
libertarians.
Obesity among children has also increased, and by similar percentages. Again, I
should emphasize that the relationship between mortality and obesity is only striking
for severe obesity, but that has increased as well. We lead the developed world in
obesity rates, though Finland, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and
Malta appear to have male obesity rates exceeding ours, and in any event overeating
and inactivity are now global phenomena. Government non-intervention is one
possible predictor of obesity. Germany has our problem and France does not. Japan
has very little obesity, as any visitor to that country can attest. It is interesting that
Japan and France are two countries where there is relatively little competition in food
marketing. In other words, in the U.S., we might blame some of our obesity on
competition to shove potato chips and soda pop and candy and fast-food burgers into
our gullets and shopping carts. I do not put too much stock in this correlation, but I
mention it because it serves the interest group theme I have already sketched.
One person’s over-eating or snacking or desk job may cause others to have
higher health care costs in the future, and this adds costs to others in the same
insurance pool. Eventually, and probably more dramatically, one person’s costs will
be forced on to most others because Medicare and disability programs will be
strained. There is a school of thought that insists that we each have an equilibrium
weight to which we return, and that no persuasion or diet or exercise regimen can
pull us away from for long. But this view ignores the increases we have experienced
in the last decade or two. I prefer to think of eating, snacking, or inactivity as a kind
of habit or addiction, and just as no single treatment method is likely to cure more
than 15% of a population habituated to cocaine, so too obesity is tough to tackle.
Taxpayers might control one another’s weight and health with education and with
many other means, but we should not be terribly surprised to see movements for socalled “fat taxes” of various kinds. We might try to impose taxes on fast-food
restaurants or on corn syrup, or on other inputs.10 Some of us might even be tempted
to propose that we each be weighed each year in the public square, and that any
“excess” be taxed in order to encourage individuals to do what is good for them –
and other taxpayers. If this seems harsh and completely implausible, as I think it is,
10

See generally Strnad, supra note 7; Andre Leicester & Frank Windmeijer, The ‘Fat
Tax’: Economic Incentives to Reduce Obesity, Institute for Fiscal Studies Briefing Note No.
49 (2004), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=1797
(discussing the potential applicability of a fat tax in Great Britain).
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then like all good lawyers we can turn every stick into a carrot, with the cost of those
carrots hidden in the background. We can pay rewards to those whose eating and
exercising and genetic makeup lead to trim shapes, and we can all pay higher taxes
to finance these encouragements. We can not simply pay people to lose weight
because of the moral hazard of people gaining weight in order to lose it and be paid.
We should not lose sight of the private sector. Dieting is a $30 billion industry in
the U.S., and the exercise industry weighs in at about $12 billion, while the costs of
obesity, direct and indirect, grew above $100 billion ten years ago. So there is either
underinvestment in obesity control or the market has been unable to come up with
investments that work.11 Most commercial diet plans are best described as faddish
and only temporarily profitable for both sellers and buyers.
How do we explain the greater government involvement in college education and
retirement planning than in controlling obesity? An optimistic possibility is that we
intervene where we have good strategies for success. It is also true that in the case of
college scholarships, the government shares rather quickly in the increased
productivity of well-educated citizens. But the self-control argument is always close
at hand. We went to college and law school, with or without the government’s
encouragement, but even there most of us do much better with external monitors
who firm up our self control. We use grades, we enroll in schools which threaten us
with failure and humiliation, and so we are accustomed to the idea that look for help
in doing that which in most time periods we want to do anyway.
College scholarships have another advantage over obesity, so to speak, in that
there is an organized and reasonably influential interest group pushing the
government to funnel money into education. I speak, of course, of universities. In
contrast, taxes on some foods (or subsidies to those who forsake it) would benefit no
organized group, just dispersed fellow insureds, and would harm the makers and
sellers of some processed foods as well as other organized interests. Interest groups
may have effectively prevented smoking regulation for some time and then, as we
already know, the threat of second-hand smoke was instrumental in bringing on more
regulation.
We might imagine subsidies for healthy foods or for fitness centers, for some
interest groups would love those. But we need to recognize that the organized
interests in favor of current feeding and inactivity patterns are stronger and more
identifiable than those opposed. The alignment of interest groups might in this way
be critical to our project, for it can explain the regulatory pattern applicable to
obesity, smoking, college scholarships, and even retirement savings.
Let us return now to self-control and to nongovernmental solutions. If many of
our afflictions are problems of self-control, then why not more privately arranged
solutions? In the case of addictives drugs, for example, why do more of us not
approach third parties, like employers, and encourage or require monthly drug tests?
Why do I not sign a contract with co-workers, perhaps, agreeing to monthly drug
tests and providing that those who test negative for twenty consecutive months will
11

AM Wolf and GA Colditz, Current Estimates of the Economic Cost of Obesity in the
United States, OBESITY RESEARCH, Vol.6, No. 2, Mar. 1998, at 97-106; The American Obesity
Association’s website warns against fad diets and misguided spending on weight loss in their
consumer protection section. The website states that Americans spend “about $30 billion a
year” on commercial weight loss. http://www.obesity.org/subs/fastfacts/Obesity_Consumer_
Protect.shtml.
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share in a pool of money created by everyone in the pool, risking, say, $5,000 at the
outset?
There are some obvious problems with this private solution to the self-control
problem. Drug tests are imperfect and costly; $5,000 may be required to deter usage,
but it may be unaffordable upfront so that it discourages participation. Other selfcontrol problems, including smoking, gambling, overeating, and under-exercising are
even less amenable to this contractual approach because detection is extremely
difficult. Even if we were to involve the government in enforcing our self-control
contract, how could it be sure that a participant had not smoked or had truly
exercised? With the government’s help we can turn to the strategy of taxing each
pack, or taxing trans-fats, but much as it would invite fraud to subsidize non-smokers
or non-gamblers, it is impossible to subsidize the avoidance of certain food inputs,
and only slightly easier to subsidize exercise.
On the other hand, if we can get over the hurdle of the personal invasion
necessary to conduct weigh-ins, obesity could be influenced by taxes or subsidies on
weight gains, losses, or maintenance.12 We might not expect such regulatory change
because of the interest group alignment mentioned earlier, but it could be done, and
if our obesity statistics get worse and worse, the we might expect this sort of thing,
though the interest group problem will be serious (the question of which inputs will
escape taxation and which will be subsidized will feed the world inside the Beltway).
With more time, I would discuss the additional and particular problems associated
with childhood obesity but, suffice to say, that we might well find more governments
offering iPods to fit and trim middle-schoolers.13

12

See J.E. Oliver & T. Lee, Public Opinion and the Politics of America’s Obesity
Epidemic 3 (Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper No.
RWP02-017, 2002). This study shows that many feel obesity is a matter of individual self
control and an appropriate target of government intervention.
13
Twenty-nine schools in Glasgow, Scotland attempted an experiment to reward students
for healthy eating. Students could earn prizes that included iPods and Microsoft X-Box
gaming systems. iPod Lure to Cut Down Junk Food, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4565923.stm, (last visited August 20, 2005).

The general issue in influencing children is the role of schools and parents in
intermediation. We do intervene and impose education requirements, and we also virtually
compel vaccinations. Intervention is more objectionable the more it invades the home. It is one
thing to teach about health in our schools, to require food labeling, and medical check-ups, and
even weigh-ins (in “Healthy Arkansas.” Virginia Anderson, An Ounce of Prevention, or
Pounds of Cruelty? THE WICHITA EAGLE ONLINE, http://www.kansas.com/mld/
kansas/living/11075189.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2005). But it would likely be a political
disaster to try and fine or tax parents for their role in their children’s obesity. And it is difficult
to fine the children directly. An optimist would say that if we could improve the health of our
adult population, that behavior would trickle down to children. A pessimist would say that
calorie consumption and activity levels are learned in one’s early years and bad habits are
difficult to alter in adulthood. It is possible that we could design some rewards for children or
penalties for schools with poor food choices. Again, let me emphasize that mine is not a
normative enterprise. I am trying to predict our likely reactions to an obesity crisis and to
explain the beginnings of school and community prizes awarded to healthy students.
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Let me return to the idea of mutual contracts and thus the possibility of opt-in
regulation, public or private. Imagine a plan in which an employer or university said
to its employees or students:
We know that many of your days are sedentary, and we take an interest in
your long-term health. We also know that most of you are eager to be fit.
We invite you voluntarily to subscribe to our health partnership for three
years. As a subscriber you will pay $2,000 per year into the plan, and we
will match each contribution. At the end of each month if you have met
the plan’s goals for the month, you receive $200, so that someone who
always makes the goals earns $400 on the $2,000 investment in the course
of the year. Someone who misses the goals in two of the months breaks
even. If you never meet the monthly goal, you will lose the $2,000
subscription – and you will have signed on to try again with another
$2,000 the next year, because the plan runs in three-year cycles. Weight
loss and maintenance is, after all, a long term endeavor.
The monthly goals would include exercise and education as well as weight
maintenance for those with desirable BMIs and modest weight loss, perhaps two
pounds per month, for those who are overweight. The organizer uses the financial
pool created by subscribers who fail to meet goals, as well as its own matching
funds, to administer the program, guarantee the payouts, and install exercise
equipment at the workplace or subsidize gym memberships.
One danger is that self-selection will be too good, and only those who would not
have had obesity problems in the first place will join up. An antidote is to require
high participation, or perhaps enroll all new employees or entering students. Another
danger is that the organizer might wish for failure in order to keep the residual; this
requires segregated funds and some rules like those we have for non-profit
organizations. In short, we subscribers will make money if we maintain, or achieve
and maintain, a healthy lifestyle, but the plan is voluntary. The motivating idea is
that some of us might exercise better self-control if immediate financial rewards
were added on to long-term health benefits.
I do not know whether I should defend this plan against the optimistic or the
pessimistic critic. The optimist would say that there is no need for the organizer to
promise matching funds. The idea of the matching funds is to encourage
participation, but an optimist might say that subscribers will materialize anyway
because they will overestimate their ability to achieve and maintain a healthy
lifestyle, or simply because this is really about the self-control that people want for
themselves. Either they think they have self control, or perhaps they are indeed very
good at identifying themselves if they do have self control, or their self control is
imperfect but the added economic incentive will help them decide to do what is good
for them anyway. But of course if this is true, then we would already see the private
market organizing plans of this kind. The organizer’s injection of funds is designed
to make the reward greater than that any mere intermediary could provide. This is
more than a pari-mutuel pool in which those who meet their goals are paid at the
expense of those who do not.
The pessimist’s objection is that first danger noted earlier, that few people would
opt in, and those volunteers are aware of their own excellent self-control or high
metabolism. Here I think we simply need a large scale experiment of the kind that an
employer or university could offer. Some employers would be excellent candidates
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for such a plan because they provide long term health insurance to its employees
well beyond retirement. They therefore have an incentive to care about employees’
long term health. The matching funds component is a way of saying that the
employer, or university, is not trying to exploit, but rather to share in the long-term
health benefits that reduced obesity would likely provide. It is the injection by the
organizer that I am counting on to overcome the first danger.
It is easy to see how the government could help bring about these plans. It could
reward long term health coverage with subsidies or credits, on grounds that long
term health care providers have more of an incentive to work on long term health
issues; it could also make the successful subscriber’s rewards tax free or tax favored.
And then of course the government - federal, state, or local - could be more
direct. It could tax pounds or reward weight loss or weight maintenance, for as we
have already seen it is probably easier to work with these markers, or outputs, than it
is to tax inputs. But for the government to act directly requires it to overcome
organized interest groups, and to overcome the strong disinclination for the
government to get more involved in private lives.
I am at heart a positivist, more inclined to say what law does and will do than to
say what it ought to do. I predict that our political and legal system will do very little
about rising obesity. Interest groups are aligned the wrong way for such intervention;
college scholarships are much more politically correct than are fat taxes. The
negative externalities are not nearly as compelling as they are for tobacco smoking.
The government will try its hand at education, and perhaps it will do better on that
score than it has in the past. I do think, or perhaps I just hope, that some private
entities or local governments will experiment with opt-in plans of the kind suggested
here.14 Any of these programs would give us an idea of whether modest economic
incentives had much impact.
By “taxing obesity – or perhaps its opposite,” I meant two things. First, opposite
in the sense of earning rewards rather than paying taxes. And second, privately
organized and even voluntary penalties and rewards, as opposed to strong-arm
government interventions. Much as safer automobiles have developed because of a
remarkable array of government interventions, education, private market maneuvers,
consumer decisions, false experiments, traffic police, alcohol taxes, gasoline taxes
and spending on better roads, so too more healthy bodies are likely to be formed by
more than individual decisions regarding tonight’s menu or tomorrow’s trip to the
gym. As law grows, so do private markets and the ingenuity of their makers. I think
we will see that obesity brings about such growth in both legal intervention and in
private markets.

14
While most employers have little financial interest in the long-term health of their
employees, some have experimented with economic incentives in an attempt to induce healthy
choices. One common plan is to offer employees modest pay supplements if they cease
smoking. For a general discussion of some of these plans, see Kenneth E. Warner & Hillary A.
Murt, Economic Incentives for Health, in ANN. REV. PUBLIC HEALTH, Vol. 5, (1984), at 10733. The authors draw some general conclusions. First, behavioral change seemed most likely
when rewards are incremental. Second, positive changes were more likely when target groups
were rewarded for the overall performance of the group rather than for individual behavior.
The authors hypothesize that peer pressure explains the second result. It is not clear whether
peer pressure could be marshaled to control obesity. Id.
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A Lecture such as this is supposed to offer a deep and inspirational message, but
I fear that I have chosen a depressing rather than an inspirational topic. On the other
hand, there is the old-fashioned, progressive view that government and law is
somehow supposed to solve all problems. My own perspective, influenced greatly by
the study of public choice, is that law does get involved in most widely broadcast
problems, whether or not that is a good thing. It makes sense in such a world to try to
understand how law and private markets interact, and how they might be expected to
change in the face of perceived problems. I have suggested here that both private
markets and governments can be in the business of enabling self control. I have tried
to suggest that this is indeed what our legal system does to a large degree with
respect to higher education, retirement savings, and tobacco. In other work I will add
to this list and show that law is indeed a tool of self-control. I do not think that
obesity is qualitatively or quantitatively different from these other things that I have
just listed, and previously discussed. Law as a system of self-control may not sound
lofty, but it is in large part what we do and who we are.
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